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Abstract
Before 1989, regime-imposed limitations of movement throughout eastern Europe meant that 
Poland had no need for a sophisticated immigration policy. Subsequently millions of 
foreigners have been entering and passing through Polish territory, making Poland an 
integral part of world, and particularly European population movements. This paper explores 
the development of Polish post-communist policy towards immigration and transmigration.
Immigration and transmigration in post-communist Poland are issues that have played 
important roles in Polish foreign policy and are ‘growth issues' in terms of complications for 
Polish society and government. Until recently these subjects have received very little 
attention in the media and academic literature. This paper narrates Polish developments in 
immigration policy and analyses the international and domestic pressures - including public 
and elite opinion - which influenced Polish responses to a new social phenomenon. The 
purpose of the paper is to explain international and domestic pressures that were considered 
by the Polish authorities in choosing their response to immigration. The paper also argues 
that only by analysing the subjectivities of Polish popular political culture and Polish elite 
culture, including their perception of the state of the international situation in an ever 
globalising Europe/world, can Polish responses to immigration be understood.
Zusammenfassung
Aufgrund der durch das politische Regime gesetzten Grenzen bedurfte es in Polen vor 1989 
keiner ausgefeilten Immigrationspolitik. Inzwischen haben Millionen von Ausländern 
polnisches Gebiet betreten und überschritten und dadurch Polen in die globalen und 
insbesondere europäischen Migrationsbewegungen integriert. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die 
Entwicklung der polnischen post-kommunistischen Immigrations- und Transmigrationspolitik. 
Er zielt auf die Erläuterung der internationalen und nationalen Zwänge, die die 
verantwortlichen polnischen Autoritäten bei ihrer Immigrationspolitik zu berücksichtigen 
hatten. Es wird auch argumentiert, daß die polnische Antwort auf die Immigration nur vor 
dem Hintergrund der Besonderheiten der polnischen populär-politischen Kultur sowie der 
Kultur der einheimischen Eliten verstanden werden kann.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Polish Approaches to Immigration
Approaches to immigration in post-communist Poland can be divided into two periods, the 
first to 1993 and the second since. Two distinguishing factors are apparent between the two 
periods. The first lies in the changed international situation. The second distinction can be 
directly linked to the first, and lies in the passivity of the approach in the first period, as 
opposed to a pro-active approach in the second.
From 1989 to 1993, Polish immigration policy was dominated by a feeling of helplessness, 
and a 'wait and see approach'. Poles tended not to believe in their own ability to deal with a 
potential catastrophe. They also did not believe in the ability of either other states and 
societies, or the international system and institutions, to deal with the movement of peoples 
from east to west. The feeling of helplessness stemmed from what Polish authorities 
described as two "worst-case scenarios [or] variants of a nightmare" fears of what could 
happen to Poland given the volatile international situation of the period.1 The first was the 
fear of the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. The worst case scenario 
perceived was a chaos of the magnitude of the October Revolution, an expectation of 
refugees from the east "marching barefoot across the snow".2 The second fear was that the 
west might choose an isolationist policy towards the countries in transition and leave Poland, 
and the countries of the region in general, without sufficient aid. This was a fear that the 
Odra-Nisa [Oder-Neisse] line [the Polish-German border] might become "the Rio Grande of 
Europe".3
By 1993 these fears ceased to play a dominant role in Polish thinking about immigration. The 
post-communist societies of east-central Europe, by and large demonstrated the ability to 
make the transition from communism in a relatively orderly manner, while the west 
demonstrated its intention not to follow an isolationist path. The issues became the ever 
increasing numbers of illegal immigrants coming to Poland and through Poland to western 
Europe, and how best to protect and develop Polish interests within the framework of a pan- 
European immigration regime. In 1993, Minister for Foreign Affairs Skubiszewski summarised 
Polish approaches to immigration as an outcome of three considerations: firstly, the 
"humanitarian", or the moral responsibility to fellow human beings; secondly, and more 
importantly, "the multifarious social and economic consequences that countries which take 
immigrants have to cope with"; and thirdly, the need to be in line with the approaches and
1 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Reports, 12 October 1990
2 ibid., 26 August 1991
3 ibid., 30 August 1991; and Reuters News Service, 21 April 1993 and 16 March 1993
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needs of the western European community, since "every failure, each appearance of 
inconsistency ... evokes negative repercussions abroad and weakens our [Polish] position".4
The failure of the coup in Moscow, the subsequent 'orderly' break up of the USSR and the 
lifting of visa requirements for Poles to travel to Germany (1991) were some of the major 
events that incrementally dispersed the fears of mass migration to Poland. However, it was 
the signing of the Polish-German repatriation agreement in 1993, and its immediate 
aftermath, that heralded a new era in Polish immigration policy. The change to a pro-active, 
integrative immigration policy was heralded during the negotiations of agreements between 
most countries of central-eastern Europe in relation to the return of illegal immigrants to the 
country of origin or the original country of transit between Poland and neighbouring countries 
throughout 1992 and 1993. However, the approaches became a clearly discernable mainstay 
of Polish policy towards immigration only from 1993. During 1993 and 1994, largely in 
reaction to the Polish-German agreement, Poland worked out repatriation agreements with 
most of its neighbouring countries. More importantly, it became apparent that most asylum 
seekers rejected by Germany had little Intention of seeking asylum in a poor country like 
Poland. The combination of the two factors gave Poland the security that it was not going to 
bear the burden of having to look after large numbers of asylum seekers.
1.2. Immigration in Polish Context
There are four main types of migration into Poland. The first is where foreigners try to use 
Poland as a transit country in their attempts to cross illegally to the west. The second refers 
to foreigners from poorer post-communist countries, mainly the former USSR, who come to 
Poland to do some petty, often illegal trading. Thirdly, there is the case of foreigners illegally 
entering and/or staying in Poland. Increases in crime are often associated with the second 
and third categories 5 Finally, there are refugees seeking asylum in Poland. The membership 
in the categories tends to be quite fluid.6
Vast majority of immigrants that have come to Poland are not immigrants in the way this term 
is commonly understood in English. That is "persons who come into a country of which they 
are not native for the purpose of permanent residence".7 Of the two largest groups of 
immigrants to Poland, the first, people trying to cross to the west, would commonly be 
understood as transmigrants - that is "persons passing through a country on their way from 
their own country to a country in which they intend to settle".8 The second group is commonly 
referred to as ‘suitcase traders’. These are people who come to Poland on short term visas, 
often many times a year in order to trade, but without necessarily the intention to stay for a
4 Polskie Radio, Warszawa 0744gmt, 29 April 1993
5 Guardian, 16 February 1993
6 Similar observations were made in International Organisation for Migration: Transit Migration in Poland, Migration 
Information Programme, April 1994, pp.2-4
7 The Macquarie Dictionary: The National Dictionary, The Macquarie Library, 2nd Edition, 1992
8 ibid.
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prolonged period. However, largely for the sake of convenience, throughout the article the 
term 'immigration' is used to encompass transmigration, seasonal migration, immigration 
(including illegal immigration), and immigration for the purpose of seeking asylum - unless 
otherwise specified.
1.3. Some Characteristics of Polish Society
Because most Poles consider their society ethnically homogeneous, many were surprised, 
even shocked by the numbers, but especially the vitality and demands of ethnic minorities 
living in post-communist Poland. For example, during the communist period the number of 
the German minority was consistently represented as "several thousand", with virtually no 
rights available to them. Subsequently, scholarly estimates have been revised and place the 
German population at 600,000-800,000, who have also won substantial legal rights to
9
express their identity. Poles were equally surprised at large numbers of foreigners who 
began arriving in Poland, including illegal immigrants and asylum seekers.10 Furthermore, 
according to a Pawel Spiewak, a Warsaw sociologist, "Poles have an acute sense of pain, 
believing that they have experienced more evil than good at the hands of neighbours and 
minorities, and that they have suffered undeserved persecution, pain and misfortune despite 
their own good works. In one survey, respondents said that Poles have received ‘more bad 
than good' from Germans [87%], Russians [71%], and Ukrainians [67%]. Twenty per cent of 
Poles interviewed also said that Jews are an 'ungrateful people’ who have persecuted 
Poles."11
Polish society entered the era of post-communism with a very poor material base - although 
improving, especially since 1993 - including a chronic housing shortage12. At the same time 
Poles generally had high expectations of material development. However, by 1991 over half 
of Poles surveyed by the Polish Television and Radio Unit for the Study of Public Opinion 
(CBOS) said that economic restructuring had caused "significantly greater hardship than they 
had expected"1-5, while three-quarters of the respondents "thought that people were 
becoming poorer... [and that] the income differential in Poland was too great".14
Overall, Polish society shares a mix of values and experiences which are at odds with the 
values of wanting to share relatively meager resources with outsiders.15
9 Kamusella, T, 'Asserting Minority Rights in Poland', in Transitions, Vol.3 No.2, 9 February 1996, p.15
10 Warsaw Voice, 23 June 1996
11 Warsaw Voice, 21 April 1996
n  For example see generally, Dabrowski, P. Occasional Paper No. 10: Ethics and Creativity - Untold Stories about 
Transformation in Poland, Department of German and Slavic Studies, Monash University, Clayton, 1997; and The 
Financial Times, 24 February 1993
13 Radio Free Europe ..., 6 December 1991
14 ibid., 7 August 1991
15 The Times, 12 April 1993
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2.1989 -1993 - The Period of Transition
2.1. Perceived Pressures from the ‘East’
To the Polish authorities considering developments in immigration the events unfolding 
throughout eastern Europe, the Balkans and the (former) Soviet Union were indeed 
menacing. The violence of Soviet troops in Vilnius, ethnic strife in the Dnestr region, the 
attempted coup in Moscow and the violent break-up of Yugoslavia were all incidents that 
obviously gave credence to 'worst-case scenario’ speculations. Meanwhile, as Solidarity 
assumed government in 1989 travel restrictions, which were a dominant trait of the 
communist period, were lifted in accordance with the long awaited and fought for values of 
personal freedom, while the shelves of Polish shops were filled ‘almost overnight’.16 As poor 
as Polish society was it was politically relatively stable and consumer goods were widely 
available, at least by the standards of pre-1989, as well as the standards of the poorer post­
communist neighbours. Hence, from 1989 Poland was considered in many post-communist 
countries as a lucrative place to visit and trade, and ever increasing numbers of visitors from 
the east and south, particularly from Russia, the Ukraine, Bulgaria and Rumania, began 
arriving in Poland - mainly on short term visas - to trade. "’In a single trip I can make five 
times what I could in a job in Belarus', says Marina Mengaleva [who sells] wooden toys and 
clothing at a Warsaw market. She is going back with some fruit for the family and dollars".17 
The phenomenon was identical to the travel of Poles to the west, as well as to other
communist countries in the seventies and eighties to trade everything from gold, vodka and
1 8textile products for quality consumer goods unavailable in Poland and hard currency.
The numbers of nationals of the Soviet Union [later its successor states] entering Poland 
increased dramatically. In 1989 there were 2.9 million19 crossings, 4.3 million 1990, 7.5
90million in 1991, 7.8 in 1992 and 8.1 million in 1993.
During the early years of transition visitors from communist and post-communist countries
tended to be discussed almost exclusively in the language of ‘immigration’, and therefore
threat and unwelcome complication, as opposed to, for example, the language of ‘tourism’
21and ‘economics’ used to describe western visitors. In fact the literature and reports 
pertaining to immigration in Poland at the time consistently identified ‘visitors from the east’ as 
the dominant issue. The main reason as to why visitors to Poland on short tourist visas have 
taken such a predominant position in immigration literature appears to be the link with the
16 Presentations commonly made to the present author during his visit to Poland - November 1993 to February 
1994.
17 The Guardian, 16 February 1993.
18 Financial Times, 17 June 1993
10 Radio Free Europe ..., 26 August 1991
20 International Organisation for Migration ..., p.12
21 In 1993 of 61 million visitors to Poland, 42 million were from Germany - obviously immigration discourse was not 
applied the them. The Times, 17 November 1994
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aforementioned fear of possible consequences of the volatility of the region for the Polish
domestic situation. Notwithstanding studies that the Soviet transport system could not handle
millions of refugees trying to escape the USSR to the west in the event of a ‘worst-case
scenario incident’, the millions coming to Poland enhanced the view that a flood of refugees
22was a real possibility. On the day of the coup in Moscow some 115,000 Soviet citizens
23were staying in Poland.
Furthermore, 'worst-case scenario' calculations also included the possibility of the 1.2 to 4 
million ethnic Poles living in the (former)Soviet Union requiring asylum.24 This was of 
particular concern to Polish authorities. Although the closing of borders to refugees of other 
nationalities could lead to major reproach at home and abroad, it could be contemplated 
given authoritative arguments that in a ‘worst-case scenario’, that is millions of refugees from 
the east and no help from the west, "Poland would fall apart as a state, as an economic
25system, in two or three months". However, the same could not be contemplated against 
fellow nationals and violate the morality of national identity. In other words, sufficient public 
opinion might be converted to, or be in favour of, the view that it might be necessary to close 
borders against refugees of other nationalities given the 'imminent collapse of the Polish 
state’. However, it would be unlikely for sufficient public opinion to accept not extending 
asylum to ethnic Poles, if they found themselves, for example, in the middle of a civil war.26
2,2, Perceived Pressures from the ‘West’
The second fear upon which Polish immigration approaches were predicated was the fear 
that the west might leave Poland to its own devices in dealing with a potential deluge of 
refugees. Much of the Polish public was generally dissatisfied, "even bitter", with the aid 
provided to Poland in its early period of transition.27 Many Poles saw themselves as having 
been the vanguard of opposition to communism and a major cause of the Soviet Blocs 
collapse. Poles expected the grateful and morally obliged west to provide such aid packages 
for the reconstruction of Poland, that Poland would have an painless transition to a capitalist
economy. The west was also expected by many to welcome Poland with open arms into
28organisations like the European Community/Union and NATO. When these expectations 
were not fulfilled, arguments about the intrinsic selfishness or realpolitik of the west began to
22 Radio Free Europe ..., 10 October 1990
23 ibid., 27 August 1991
24 ibid., 26 August 1991
25 ibid., 4 January 1991
26 ibid.
27 The Times, 16 Aprii 1993. It is worth pointing out that Poland benefited from substantial assistance programs 
organised by the western countries. For example, a group of 17 developed countries - often referred to as the Paris 
Club - cut Poland's debt owed to those countries by 50%, on the 21st of April 1991. Radio Free Europe ..., 6 
December 1991. In May 1991 the Czechoslovak Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus even argued that American 
assistance to Poland was so substantial compared to that offered to Czechoslovakia that it was unfair - "US$ 15 
million in assistance to Czechoslovakia, compared to US$ 1 billion and debt forgiveness for Poland". Ibid., 14 May 
1991
28 ibid.
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gain ground. Matters were not helped by such incidents as Chancellor Kohl's confusing 
messages as to the permanency of the post-1945 Polish-German border during the 
negotiations on German reunification. Classic, grand narrative reminders from Polish history 
such as the Allies having failed to come to the aid of Poland in 1939, or having sold Poland 
out to Stalin after the Second World War, were also used to emphasise the nature of 
realpolitik as practised by the western nation-states.
It was also apparent that immigration was one of the most important issues in western 
European politics and that Poland was perceived in the west as both a supplier of immigrants 
and as a path for immigrants from the increasingly mobile east. Emigration of Poles was at its 
highest level between 1981 and 1988 when 653,000 Poles emigrated to the west.
Subsequently, however, the numbers of Polish emigrants dropped to about 20,000 per
■2 ()
annum. Germany, Poland's wealthiest neighbour and the country with a highly advanced 
and generous social welfare system, was the goal for most post-communist migrants, and 
had to cope with hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers annually. Their numbers peeked 
at about 440,000 in 1992, of these about 25% had come either from or through Poland.31
The strength of racist and anti-immigrant feeling in western Europe had an affect on Polish 
policy makers. The nationalist parties in France and northern Italy, which went to the polls
32largely on the issue of limiting immigration, were increasingly successful in the early 1990's. 
Violence against immigrants was on the rise throughout Europe. Although it was the rise of 
disturbances in Germany that was particularly worrying to Polish policy makers.33 Anti­
immigration attitudes increasingly played part not just in the politics of the far right, but also 
in the mainstream of western domestic politics. Many mainstream politicians emphasised the 
threat immigration was posing to their societies' social fabric, at times, their positions imitated 
the attitudes of the far right. For example, Chancellor Kohl's statements that immigration was 
the cause of violence against immigrants, that is that immigrants had only themselves to 
blame for the violence perpetrated against them, appeared to legitimise thugish behaviour.34 
There was also talk by German government officials that they were considering implementing 
new high-tech devices to control immigration from Poland, including the construction of an 
electronic wall along the Polish-German frontier35 and "infra-red devices" to scan for illegal
29 Korcelli, P. 'International Migration in Europe: Polish Perspectives in the 1990's\ in International Migration 
Review, Vol.XXVI No.2, Summer 1992, p.293
30 Reuters .... 12 March 1993
31 ibid., 9 March 1993
32 Hockenos P. Free to Hate: The Rise of the Right in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, Routledge, 1993, pp.6,57
33 Ibid., see generally chapters 1 and 2
34 ibid., pp. 33-4
35 Reuters ..., 4 January 1993
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entrants.36 From 1991 the domestic debate in Germany made it plain that Germany was
37going to tighten up its liberal asylum laws.
The liberalisation and démocratisation of Poland also meant that western European countries 
were classifying Poland as a ‘safe country', that is a country which was no longer a source of 
refugees, and one in which it was safe for refugees to seek asylum. Poland was being 
accused by western governments of not being committed to checking illegal immigration, and 
the press was full of reports of how easy it was for Illegal immigrants to cross Poland's 
western border, and how easily Polish border guards succumbed to corruption. Events that 
pointed to an 'openness' of the west also tended to be represented as potentially disastrous 
to Poland by Polish officials. The fact that Germany was taking in 100,000's of refugees from 
Yugoslavia was not represented in the light of the west being serious about aiding post­
communist countries, but rather as Germany facing inevitable crises because of the over 
extention of its cultural resources.
2.3. Polish responses to the immigration problem
Fundamentally, the Polish authorities believed that they had very little control over regional 
immigration developments, particularly potential mass migration from the [former] Soviet 
Union in transition. Poland, by and large, had to wait and see whether the situation in the east 
would deteriorate or stabilise. To stave off these potential threats, the Polish government 
adopted measures to offer maximum diplomatic support to fellow post-communist countries 
attempting to stabilise and democratise the region, and called upon western governments to
39do their utmost to help the region, diplomatically and materially. In relation to the 
developments in the west, Polish approaches were also dominated by the waiting game. 
However, there were more opportunities to maneouver and to influence. The fear that 
western governments might leave Poland to its own devices in dealing with the refugee 
problem was predicated on the view that the west might define its interests in isolationist 
terms.40 In order to counter this possibility the Polish government applied two strategies. 
Firstly, the government used moral arguments emphasising that the west had a moral 
responsibility to help Poland. Secondly, Polish politicians used a pragmatic argument 
underlining that it was in the west's best interest to help Poland.
In relation to the former, Poles reminded the west that Poland belonged to a common, 
western civilisation, and that following the Second World War the Poles were torn away from 
this heritage. Partially as a result of western compliance at the partition agreed at Yalta,
36 ibid., 15 February 1993
37 The German infrastructure was under severe stress since the fail of the Berlin Wall. Throughout the 90's 
Germany also led the way in accepting refugees from the former Yugoslavia
38 Guardian, 30 June 1993; and The Times, 5 January 1993
39 ibid., 24 February 1993
‘,0 The Times, 5 March 1993
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Poles suffered Soviet oppression. Furthermore, while the west was engaged in the Cold War 
with the USSR, the Poles had consistently been a thorn in the Soviet side - a partisan nation.
The second and more prominent Polish argument played on the west's fear of being flooded 
by refugees. It was argued that, it was in the west's best interest to get Poland to participate 
in the European immigration regime. Since Poland lacked the requisite resources and 
expertise to deal with immigration, it needed aid. In return for western assistance, Poland 
assured the west that it would do its utmost to deal with immigration, both in terms of 
ensuring the security of western Europe's eastern borders, and in treating immigrants in 
accordance with the institutionalised norms of the west and the international community.41 To 
emphasise Poland's willingness to alleviate western fears in 1991 Poland agreed to accept 
the return of illegal immigrants who had been caught in Germany, but who did not to file for 
asylum, and who the German authorities could prove had come through Poland.42 By 1993 
Poland agreed to accept the return of any asylum seeker from Germany who came through 
Poland, if the German authorities were satisfied that their claims could be dealt with by the 
Polish authorities. This meant that virtually all asylum seekers who arrived through Poland 
could be sent back - that is about 100,000 annually.43
General assistance for the transformation of the Polish economy was also argued to be 
necessary, since if Poland were to become a materially affluent country, it would be able to 
care for immigrants out of its own resources, which would lighten the western load. Finally, 
aid for Poland's reconstruction would also ensure that Poles themselves would be less likely 
to want to migrate to the west.
Poland took seriously the 'worst-case scenario' possibility. That a ‘state of emergency’ type 
solution was at the top of the Polish agenda was reflected in the 1990 appointment of a 
senior military officer to head the Bureau for Refugees, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
The appointee, Lieutenant-Colonel Skoczylas, was often very dramatic about the dangers of 
migration and the need to deploy the toughest measures possible in the face of this potential 
scourge. According to Polish calculations, the absolutely highest number of asylum seekers 
that Poland could manage was 50, 000 - at an estimated cost of US$130 million.44 The 
appointment of this tough talking military man to the top immigration post may also have been 
a message to the west that Poland viewed immigration as a very serious issue and as a pan- 
European problem and was prepared to play its part in the crackdown on immigration.
The 'wait and see’ approach was reflected in the arguments put forward by the Polish 
authorities in their preparation for joining international society in dealing with immigration, as 
well as in the slow pace, or perhaps more accurately, the timing with which the Polish
41 Guardian, 16 February 1993
42 Reuters ..., 15 December 1992
43 ibid., 5 May 1993
44 Radio Free Europe ..., 26 August 1991
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authorities developed and/or reformed domestic institutions to deal with immigration. 
Although the first governmental organ established to deal specifically with refugees was 
established in late 1990, few other major domestic infrastructural developments took place. 
No legal reform took place in relation to the treatment and status of foreigners in Poland. The 
operative laws dated from 1963, and were widely recognised as inadequate, both by the 
authorities and their critics.45 Neither were there any major attempts to take on the rampant 
corruption within the ranks of the border guards.
The Polish government presented its position as impossible throughout the negotiations with 
western countries in relation to the taking back of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants who 
arrived from Poland. Poland had to have substantial financial support from the west to 
develop its border controls, as well as the institutions dealing with immigrants: money to 
employ and train more border guards, purchase sophisticated equipment, construct camps, 
pay for housing and pensions, and to train and employ administrative and legal personnel, 
etc.46 It also needed time, and support from the west, to negotiate with countries from which 
and through which the immigrants were coming to Poland.47 In late 1990, Polish officials 
argued that Poland was not able to become party to the Geneva Convention on refugees and 
related protocols on the grounds that Poland "could never afford to meet Its requirements
48fully, especially in regard to provision of jobs, housing and educational opportunities". 
Nevertheless, only a few months after this proclamation Poland signed the Geneva 
Convention.49 This was in line with the humanitarian sentiments of many Poles, and perhaps 
more importantly, in line with the need to appear to the west that Poland was willing to 
embrace western-international humanitarian norms.
In the 1989 to 1993 period numerous policies limiting freedom of movement, particularly from 
countries of the former Soviet Union, were maintained. Former Soviet citizens needed a visa, 
as well as an official invitations from a Polish citizen In order to visit Poland. Quite rapidly, 
these invitations became an easily circumvented restriction, since they could be picked up 
very cheaply in most open air markets.50 Another policy limiting freedom of movement was 
enacted in relation to Rumania in 1991. Prior to 1989, the Pollsh-Rumanian agreement 
simply stipulated that travel was possible with an appropriate visa. In 1991, requirements for 
an official invitation, as well as the need to demonstrate a return ticket and US$20 of 
spending money per day of stay were put in place.51 Unlike the policy towards formerly
45 British Broadcasting Cooperation Monitoring Service; Central Europe and Balkans, 9 December 1993
46 Reuters ..., 24 February 1993
47 British Broadcasting Corporation ..., 1 April 1993
48 Radio Free Europe ..., 4 January 1991
49 ibid., 26 August 1991
50 ibid.
51 ibid.
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Soviet countries, this was not kept on the books from the communist period as a 'just in case’
52measure, but represented an active attempt to limit Rumanian migration.
The most vivid example of Polish idealism and humanitarianism was the reported 
spontaneous and emotional invitation to thousands of refugees fleeing the Yugoslav conflict 
in 1992. These were mainly women and children and were provided with accommodation in 
former workers' resorts and sanitariums in southern Poland. The people of the region also 
played their part in donating clothes and providing home cooked meals to the refugees.53
Polish reactions to foreigners were mixed. Many Poles empathised with the material and 
security needs of their poorer neighbours.54 Feelings of empathy were aided by the fact that 
'suitcase trade’, although often looked down on, had been a part of life of many Poles. A 
great many Poles have undertaken this form of business since the 1970's. From a more 
pragmatic perspective, the petty trade provided Poles with an access to cheap goods, and an 
outlet for goods that Poland was producing. Most goods produced in Poland could not find 
western buyers, largely because they were considered inferior products.55 On the other 
hand, Poles felt that their country was being stripped of its resources, that the demand 
created by foreigners added to price increases on still relatively scarce goods, and that the 
cheap products from other post-communist countries undermined domestic manufacture. 
Poles were also concerned that hard currency, crucially needed for investment at a time 
when Polish currency was barely convertible was being bought up by foreigners. Other Polish 
fears stemmed from the beliefs, that criminals from the east infiltrated into Poland. They also 
believed that the petty traders operated mainly without licenses and without border 
declarations, thus denying the state treasury its revenue. The petty trade in alcohol 
challenged the government's monopoly of the production and sale of this item, and In 1991 
the State Treasury lamented that it was losing as much as US$80 million a year.56
In 1993, the Christian National Union and the National Rebirth of Poland - arguably the most 
important proponents of Polish populism, who advocate the concept 'Poland for the Poles’ 
[Polska dla Polakow], and that only a 'Catholic is a Pole' [Polak-Katolik]57 - organised a rally 
against the proposed signing of the Polish-German agreement on the deportation of asylum 
seekers. The primary objection was that refugees should be the concern of the rich west and
52 Although the numbers of Rumanian entrants were never staggering the introduction of travel restriction appears 
to have succeeded in limiting Romanian entries. In 1991 some 260,000 Romanians entered Poland, in 1992 
210,000, and in 1993, this dropped to 190,000. International Organisation for Migration ..., p.17
53 Guardian, 15 October 1992; also see Reuters ..., 22 July 1992
54 Guardian, 15 October 1992
55 The Times, 16 April 1993
56 Radio Free Europe .... 26 August 1991
57 Hockenos, Free to Hate ..., see generally chapter 7
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not poor Poland, The rally was countered by a protest organised by Polish anarchists
58chanting anti-racist and anti-xenophobic slogans.
Although tension between Poles and the traders existed and sometimes broke into violence,
the main group towards whom hostility was expressed was the Romanian immigrants,
particularly the Roma. Between 50,000 and 70,000 Rumanians, many of them Roma, have
59been staying in Poland since 1990. The Roma have been singled out, by both the 
authorities and much of the public opinion, as the main ethnic group in Poland 'causing' 
ethnic tension. They were perceived to form the bulk of foreigners causing a nuisance, such 
as harassing for alms in the streets and train stations. Large number of beggars - often 
women and children - have been a common sight in all of Poland's major cities. So has been 
the sight of people sleeping in hallways and train stations. Roma are commonly considered 
as living off begging and petty crime rather than 'honest work'.60
The primary example of tension spilling over into violence between Poles and foreigners 
occurred at Mlawa, Ironically, these were not foreigners in the sense used thus far, but Roma 
'indigenous' to Poland. A riot broke out in a well-to-do suburb of a town in central Poland with 
a substantial Roma population, whereby a mob torched cars, sacked shops and houses, and 
bashed a number of Roma men. After the incident hundreds of Polish Roma left for Sweden 
where they were granted asylum.61
3.1993-1997: The Period of Normalisation
The political volatility of the region began to stabilise, or at least exhibit fewer volatile or 
explosive characteristics. The Soviet Bloc's ability to make the transition from communism to 
pluralism and democracy in a relatively orderly fashion, as well as the transition of the USSR 
from Soviet rule to that of independent successor nation-states, greatly eased the fear of 
potential 'worst-case scenarios’, and such fears began to dissipate. In short there was a 
relative stability between and within the Polish post-communist closest neighbours. More 
specifically in the context of this piece, there were no masses of refugees marching through 
the snow.
Simultaneously, although the Yugoslav conflict continued to remind of 'worst-case scenario' 
consequences, it strengthened the idea that pan-European co-operation was the best policy 
that Polish immigration policy makers should pursue. The Yugoslav conflict emphasised that 
the west was, by and large, willing to look after refugees. The conflict also emphasised that 
refugees were not interested in immigrating to Poland. In fact Polish offers of asylum to
58 British Broadcasting Corporation ..., 25 May 1993
59 Radio Free Europe .... 26 August 1991
60 ibid.
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'Yugoslavs’ were at times specifically rejected, refugees preferring to go to western Europe 
where "the conditions are better"62
The fear of western isolationism waned and policies of the west were increasingly interpreted 
in Poland in the context of a slow and difficult process of integration and progress, whereby 
all concerned looked after their interests first, but that the greatest gain would be achieved 
through co-operation of east and west. In other words, it became accepted that the west was 
unwilling to establish two Europes. That the western governments, by and large, judged it to 
be in their own interest to swap import concessions or aid for a solution to the immigration 
problem.63 During the negotiations with the west, for example in the context of agreements 
with Germany in relation to the return of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers, Poland 
managed to negotiate substantial aid to lessen its burdens. The main package was the 1993 
120 million marks from Germany to develop border controls and an infrastructure to detect
64and deal with refugees. Given the great concern in the west regarding immigration, the 
west's non-isolationist approach, and the apparent fact that immigrants were interested in 
Poland more as a route than a destiny, the Poles found themselves in a stronger position 
than they had previously envisaged. Therefore, when it was believed that appeasement of 
the west was contrary to Polish interests, the Poles were willing to pursue policies contrary to 
the interests of the west.
Poland's foreign, economic and immigration policies reflect new-found confidence. Poland 
sees itself as a country of transit between west and east, and accordingly pursues policies 
emphasising free trade and freedom of movement. It is pursuing its integration into the 
European Union free market, and free trade with neighbouring countries, including with the 
potentially very large market of Russia.65
In its pursuit of freedom of movement in Europe, Poland has found itself at odds with western 
governments, particularly over visa-free travel with Russia. Poland has been incrementally 
reducing travel restriction with Russia, and a Polish-Russian agreement was signed late in 
1996 allowing visa-free travel between the two countries - subject to the signing of a 
readmission agreement. The main western concern is that as travel restrictions with Poland 
are being reduced, and as Poland is heading for the elimination of national borders under the 
EU, Poland will become [or continue to be] a major route for illegal immigrants from eastern
r- 66Europe.
Poland's pursuit of freedom of movement policy reflects its current position on immigration. 
The 'suitcase traders’ from the post-communist countries have since 1993 been increasingly
62 ibid., 22 July 1992
63 ibid., 21 April 1993
64 British Broadcasting Corporation .... 18 May 1993
65 Zycie Warszawy, 29 November 1996
66 Warsaw Voice, 8 December 1996
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described by policy makers in positive terms. That is, they are rarely couched in terms of 
immigration, but rather in terms of trade.67 They provide inexpensive goods, purchase local 
goods and services, and provide contacts with other post-communist markets. Refugees and 
illegal immigrants are generally not perceived as an overriding concern to Poland, although 
Poles are increasingly surprised at the numbers of illegal immigrants, indicating a growing 
concern over the issue. The numbers of illegal immigrants staying in Poland appear to have
increased substantially. In 1991 it was estimated that 20,000-30,000 people from the Soviet
68Union alone were staying illegally in Poland , while in 1993 some sources place illegal 
residents at 500,000.
The two main categories of illegal immigrants in Poland are either those waiting for an 
opportunity to go to the west, or those able to make a better living in one of the most affluent 
of post-communist countries. Most illegal immigrants tend to leave Poland within a few 
months, the latter after they have saved some money, and the former either because they 
have found their way west or failed to do so. Both categories are made up overwhelmingly of 
citizens of the poorest former communist European countries: Rumanians, Russians, 
Bulgarians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. However, amongst illegal immigrants trying to get 
across to the west there are also substantial numbers of citizens from African and Asian 
'Less Developed Countries’, particularly Sri Lankans, Indians, Bangladeshis and
70Pakistanis.
In 1996 there have been about 2300 requests for asylum in Poland.71 Despite this relatively 
small number, the issue has accrued political significance, largely because the refugees are 
monitored internationally and Polish authorities perceive it as crucial to appear to be 
upholding human rights standards at a level akin to that of the west. This latter point 
emphasises Poland's readiness to be integrated into western structures, as well as an 
expectation of receiving further aid from the west. The ethnic mix of registered asylum
seekers comprises mainly citizens of the former Yugoslavia and people from African and
72Asian 'Less Developed Countries’. Successful asylum seekers stay in Poland on renewable 
12 month visas and, due to the housing shortage, can stay in 'rotating accommodations’ for 
up to 15 months, afterwards they have to cope on their own.7"3 They are shifted from dwelling 
to dwelling as housing becomes available. It is unclear precisely why their accommodation 
needs to be rotated. However, it seems that they are rotated within the general social security 
system in competition with other disadvantaged members of Polish society. Most asylum 
seekers appear not to want to settle down in Poland but hope to be relocated to a western
67 See for example, Warsaw Voice, 8 December 1996
68 Radio Free Europe ..., 26 August 1991
69 British Broadcasting Corporation 9 December 1993
70 Rzeczpospolita, 27 February 1997; Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 February 1997; Nowa Europa, 27 February 1997, and 
International Organisation for Migration..., pp. 17-18
71 Warsaw Voice, 24 November 1996
72 ibid., 23 June 1996
73 ibid.
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country. Nevertheless, the Polish approach of maintaining refugees on renewable 12 month 
visas emphasises the broader Polish approach that refugees are and ought really to be the 
problem of the west. There is no evidence of attempts to offer refugees citizenship, nor of any 
other meaningful programs which attempt to integrate refugees into Polish society.
The Polish authorities appear to be interested in maintaining only the minimal fulfilment of 
international moral and legal duties. Furthermore, asylum seekers are of concern because 
they are directly linked to the public purse, and therefore open to scrutiny. Since the issue is 
linked to the public purse it can be used for political point scoring, including right wing- 
populist criticisms that money could be spent better on Poles - types of arguments that are 
potentially alluring in a political culture in transition. The fact that some of the very people who 
are employed to look after refugees and their rights think that "we ... pamper them [refugees] 
... [and] there is no country as open to abuse [by refugees]" reflects a lack of commitment by
74Polish authorities to refugee rights.
Poland has increasingly used immigration as a bargaining chip in its relations with the west. It 
has been emphasising that immigration is one of the great problems facing Europe, although 
not necessarily one of the great problems facing Poland. Poland is one of the most ardent 
supporters of the policy of exchanging aid and 'imports for migrants’. This is in line with the 
resolutions of bodies like the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE].75 
The argument is that in order to ease the pressure of immigration on the west, the west must 
provide maximum support, particularly through economic concessions and aid to the 
developing post-communist countries. In spite of the particularly humanitarian resolutions 
emphasised by the west, it is quite clear that an equally vigorous policy aimed at physically 
stopping immigrants from entering the west is maintained on the books.
Poland hopes that it can be a major winner from both the 'humanitarian' and the 'realist' 
policies. Firstly, Poland hopes that the development of other post-communist countries will 
offer the region political stability and strengthen the development of eastern markets, to 
which Poland, as the country in the heart of Europe, will have excellent access.76 Secondly, 
Poland hopes to continue to secure major concessions from the west as the vanguard of the 
European struggle against immigration. As Poland is being integrated into the western 
European economy and society it is difficult for the Odra-Nisa to be the primary line stopping 
illegal immigrants from entering the west. According to Chancellor Kohl "It cannot be that 
Germany's eastern border remains the border of the European Union".77 As Poland is one of 
the first countries in line for EU membership, it appears that Poland's eastern border may well 
become the European Union's eastern border for some time to come, and so Polish 
authorities argue that it is Poland's eastern borders that need strengthening. Thus there is an
74 ibid.
75 British Broadcasting Corporation .... 19 July 1993
76 Polskie Radio, Warszawa 0744gmt, 29 April 1993
77 Reuters .... 7 October 1994
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optimism that Poland will continue to become a major recipient of aid from the EU in order to 
control illegal immigration.
In order to downplay the fears that Poland might become an easy route for illegal immigrants, 
Poland emphasises its domestic reforms and its co-operative attitude in the international 
arena in relation to refugees and illegal immigrants. It also emphasises that western aid 
provided for reconstructing its immigration system is used efficiently.
The main aid package that Poland received from the west to tighten its border controls, 
reform the legal system and establish practices and facilities for the upkeep and the 
processing of immigrants and refugees, came from Germany as part of a 1993 agreement on 
repatriation of asylum seekers. Since the money arrived, a repatriation camp was opened in
78Poland (1996). Until then immigrants awaiting repatriation were held in ordinary jails. In 
early 1995, a new law allowing Polish authorities to hold illegal immigrants awaiting 
processing for up to 90 days was passed. The law took some five years of negotiations
between the various factions in parliament and the judiciary. Previously, a 1963 law allowed
79only two days of detention of foreign nationals. The Polish border guards were retrained 
and re-equipped with new sophisticated technology, including carbon dioxide detectors to 
scan container trucks for life signs. Polish authorities also reported a crackdown on
corruption among the border guards. For example, six guards were made an example in
80early 1996. A joint data base on criminal activity was established by the police and the
81border guards; until then, the two formations had had little contact and co-ordination.
In the international sphere, since diplomatic flurry began in 1992 on deportation agreements 
with Germany and neighbouring countries, there has been no slowdown. In addition to having 
signed repatriation agreements with virtually all of the countries in the region, Poland has 
continued to negotiate and sign numerous agreements related to immigration with most of 
them. Reports have been prolific of agreements reached at both bilateral and multilateral 
levels regarding such matters as the control of the smuggling of drugs, people and stolen 
goods, the opening of new border crossings, and the establishment of data bases on known 
criminals. The continuous flurry of activity in the international arena has been indicative of 
Poland's wish to be, or appear to be, at the forefront of the construction of an integrated pan- 
European immigration regime.
The pursuit of a pan-European integration policy is also useful to the Polish authorities in their 
attempt to occupy the high moral ground, particularly as it is in line with the public resolutions 
of western governments and major European organisations. The policy strengthens Poland's 
case in its pursuit of free transit in the region, especially since Poland is also adopting
78 Zycie Warszawy, 18 July 1996
79 Reuters ..., 24 March 1995
80 Rzeczpospolita, 27 February 1996; Gazeta Wyborcza 27 February 1996; and Nowa Europa, 27 February 1996
81 ibid.
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policies to control immigration and placate western fears. It also strengthens Poland's 
relations with other post-communist countries. Not only is Poland offering diplomatic support 
to post-communist governments in their arguments for access to western markets and 
greater aid and co-operation, but it is also opening itself up and is doing so in spite of 
pressure from the west. Here Polish authorities attempt to emphasise the unity of interest that 
Poland shares with the post-communist countries in the region. There is, of course a price. 
For example, the lifting of restrictions on travel to Poland tends to be tied to agreements to 
accept the repatriation of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers who come through a third 
country to Poland. Thus, however, Poland is increasingly finding itself in a similar position vis- 
à-vis the poorer post-communist countries as the western countries are to it. It has the 
economic advantage and they have the refugees. The long negotiations with Russia have 
been stalled primarily because Russia does not want to accept repatriated refugees.
Although, in the pursuit of a free transit policy, the Polish government has ceased to couch
'suitcase traders’ in terms of immigration and therefore threat, socially the same types of
82concerns and social tension remain as in the period to 1993. Furthermore, Polish 
authorities following western approaches have worked out which are the 'desirable' and 
'undesirable’ migrants. |t may be argued that the authorities under public pressure and ‘a 
perceived green light’ from the west, have increasingly used stricter and illegal means to 
deals with undesirable migrants.
Of all foreign nationals, Poles still perceive the Roma as the major cause of public nuisance. 
Since the establishment in 1995 of the OSCE Democratic Institutions Office in Warsaw it has 
received hundreds of complaints by Roma about mistreatment. It appears that the 
authorities, in response to public opinion, have begun moving to solve the problem of the 
Roma in Poland. For example, on the 19th of June 1996, in a massive 2 a.m. police raid on a 
Roma encampment in a Warsaw suburb, 113 Roma were arrested. They were deported to 
the Ukraine the very next day. Polish authorities have argued that no civil rights of the 
deportees were violated. However, on this occasion, critics have been particularly
84concerned. The Helsinki Human Rights Watch reports have argued that Polish police and 
bureaucrats routinely fail to observe the full letter of the law in their dealings with illegal 
immigrants and refugees. The Group points out that foreigners receive very little protection 
under Polish domestic law, and that international law is largely left to the interpretation of 
domestic law which needs to be developed. Lacking legal channels foreigners are largely left
85to "the good will and competence of civil servants". On this particular occasion, it is difficult 
to accept that a system which is admitted to be less than totally efficient, and in need of 
further reforms and funds, could process 113 illegal immigrants in one day. The introduction 
of the 90 day detention law was largely based on the argument that illegal immigrants were
82 See for example, Warsaw Voice, 14 July 1996
83 British Broadcasting Corporation 5 December 1995
84 Warsaw Voice, 30 June 1996
85 British Broadcasting Corporation ..., 9 December 1993
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notorious for making the processing very difficult and time consuming for the authorities, for86example, by loosing documents.
4. Conclusion
Polish responses to immigration have developed primarily in the context of the changing 
pressures of the international situation and values held dominating Polish political culture. In 
the period to 1993, the main pressures were the possibility of mass migration from the Soviet 
region if that region were to be afflicted with a civil war-type situation; an isolationist policy 
from the west if the first scenario were to eventuate, a population which on the one hand 
highly insecure and suspicious of foreigners and foreign powers, and on the other empathic 
to the plight of people from the poorest and most volatile post-communist countries. Apart 
from some preparation for the influx of refugees, such as the drawing up of plans to establish 
debriefing centres in isolated parts of the country, the primary response was to attempt to 
convince the west that it could not afford to take an isolationist approach.
Once the political situation in post-communist countries stabilised and the west showed that 
its policy was one of integrating Poland into its economic, political and defence system, the 
‘worst-case scenario’ fears dissipated. The new set of international considerations became 
how to integrate Poland into a pan-European immigration regime. Poland was a major route 
for immigrants to the countries of the EU - and particularly its most powerful member 
Germany - which were extremely concerned with the effects of immigration on the stability of 
their social fabric. Although the fear of foreigners being a security threat has significantly
87decreased since the early 1990's , the same cannot be necessarily said about the apparent 
general perception of immigrants as a negative and unwelcome phenomenon). The main 
pressures on Poland were, and continue to be, how to crack down on illegal immigration and 
cease to be a major route to the west, while doing this in accordance with western norms of 
how immigrants and refugees ought to be treated. A difficult task for a country in the process 
of developing its economy, democratic and civic traditions and institutions, as well as one 
getting used to the ethno-cultural diversity in a globalising world.
86 Warsaw Voice, 23 June 1996
87 Christian Haerpfer and Claire Wallace ‘Xenophobic Attitudes Towards Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in Central 
and Eastern Europe', Paper presented at the symposium “Justiz und Fremdenfeindlichkeif, Paul Lazarsfeld 
Society, 23-24 October 1997, p. 12
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